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ARCHIVES OF VIOLENCE: SEEKING
AND PRESERVING RECORDS ON MASS
SECTARIAN ATTACKS IN INDIA
-Surabhi

Chopra*

Abstract-Independent India has seen multiple instances of
systematic mass violence, targeted at minorities, and tolerated, if not facilitated, by the state. However, the preservation
and publicisation of official records on these instances has been
inadequate. This is despite such information being vital to preventing as well as responding to future episodes of mass violence. This paper examines the difficulties in obtaining official
records on mass violence through the Right to Information
(RTI) Act. It specifically looks at records concerning four
instances between 1983 and 2002, in Nellie, Delhi, Bhagalpur,
and Gujarat. The author concludes by proposing a framework to
make such records more accessible to the general public.

I. INTRODUCTION
Since India gained independence, it has experienced a number of episodes of
targeted sectarian violence against religious minorities.' The worst of these episodes have claimed hundreds of lives, injured hundreds, and displaced thousands
from their homes. This article evaluates access to information about mass sectarian violence in India.
I focus on four occasions between 1983 and 2002 when religious minorities
were attacked on a large scale. I briefly describe these events in Section I below.
In Section II, I discuss an attempt to secure official records related to these four
episodes of mass violence using India's Right to Information Act. I consider
why access to information about these grave atrocities is vital. In Section III, I
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propose that the state create public archives about them and suggest how it might
do so.
II. MASS SECTARIAN VIOLENCE: FOUR EPISODES
Below, I discuss mass sectarian violence in Nellie, central Assam, in 1983; in
Delhi, the national capital, in 1984; in Bhagalpur, Bihar in 1989; and in the western state of Gujarat in 2002.
A. Nellie, 1983
On 18 February 1983, at least 1800 Bengali Muslims, were murdered in the
small Assamese town of Nellie and its surrounding villages.2 Unofficial estimates put the death toll at 3000. The Nellie massacre was committed over the
course of a few hours by people from neighbouring villages wielding knives and
machetes. It was the single worst sectarian attack in India since independence. 3
The larger context of the massacre was the anti-immigrant movement consuming
Assam at the time, which had led to civil disobedience, as well as violence in
protest against the increased numbers of Bangladeshi Muslims, and in particular, their inclusion in electoral rolls.' Many of the direct participants in the Nellie
massacre belonged to the Tiwa tribe. In subsequent years, some perpetrators said
that they had been urged to attack their Muslim neighbours by the leaders of the
anti-immigrant agitation, who later formed the Asom Gana Parishad party that
was voted into power after the agitation ended.
B. Delhi, 1984
Eighteen months after the Nellie massacre, Sikhs in Delhi were brutally
attacked following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31
October 1984. In the week after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, at least 2733 Sikhs
were killed by mobs led by the ruling Congress party 6 - unofficial estimates put
the death toll at 4000.7
2

My account of violence in Nellie is based on T.D. Tewary, Report of the Commission of Inquiry
on Assam Disturbances, Guwahati: Government of Assam ("Tewary Commission report") 265-

3

4

6

315 (1984).
The survey of significant instances of sectarian violence in independent India by Engineer
(2004) indicates that the Nellie massacre was the incident with the single-largest death toll. See
Engineer, supra note 1.
Sanjib Baruah, Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and PoliticalTurmoil -Assam, 1979-1985, 26 ASIAN
SURVEY 1184 (Nov., 1986). See also Makiko Kimura, Violence and Collective Identity in the
Narrativeson the Nellie Incident, 4 ASIAN ETHNICITY 225 (2003).

See Kimura at 233.
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R.K. Ahooja, Ahooja Committee Report (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India, 1986).
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C. Bhagalpur, 1989
A few years later, in October and November 1989, mass violence in Bhagalpur,
Bihar claimed almost 1000 lives according to official estimates. Many parts
of north India were tense at the time as the result of a campaign by Hindumajoritarian political groups to tear down the sixteenth-century Babri mosque,
believed to stand on the site where the Hindu god Ram had been born, and
replace it with a temple. The immediate trigger for violence in Bhagalpur had
been a clash between members of a procession carrying bricks for the proposed
temple through a Muslim neighbourhood, and some residents of the area. This
relatively minor incident was followed a few days later by attacks led by thousand-strong mobs in the town of Bhagalpur and villages surrounding it. In addition to killing over a thousand people, most of them Muslim, these attacks left
several hundred people injured and displaced approximately 50,000 from their
homes.
D.

Gujarat, 2002

Muslims were, once again, the targets of mob violence in 2002, this time in
Gujarat. As in Bhagalpur in 1989, the Hindu-majoritarian movement was implicated in violence that led to over 2000 deaths in the western state of Gujarat in
February 2002. On 27 February 2002, two train carriages carrying Hindu pilgrims were set on fire in the Gujarati town of Godhra, killing 58 people. This
brutal violence was followed by many days of attacks on Muslims across Gujarat,
led by Hindu-majoritarian groups.' Ministers in the Gujarat government as well
as members of the Gujarat legislature participated in these attacks.0 The police
did not intervene, allowing not just looting sprees but multiple, hours-long massacres to take place."
E. Systematic violence, allowed by the state
Labelling these events as "riots", as is common in India, suggests that they
involved frenzied, mutual confrontations between different groups. This obscures
the crucial fact that violence in Nellie, Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat was systematic, organized by political organizations, and targeted at particular minorities.
My account of violence in Bhagalpur is based on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry to

9

inquire into the communal disturbances at Bhagalpur, 1989 (1995), Patna: Government of
Bihar; ("Bhagalpur Inquiry"); Singh, A.K. (1989) Bhagalpur Riots in Retrospect: Report of the
Special Additional DistrictMagistrate, Law & Order, Bhagalpur; Report of the Commissioner of
Bhagalpur on the BhagalpurRiots, 1989, Bhagalpur: Government of Bihar.
Human Rights Watch, "We Have No Orders to Save You": State Participationand Complicity
in Communal Violence in Gujarat 15-18 (2002). See also 1 Concerned Citizens Tribunal, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CARNAGE IN GUJARAT LIST OF INCIDENTS AND EVIDENCE

1o

37- 191.
Human Rights Watch, supra note 9, at 24, 49; Concerned Citizens Tribunal, supra note 8, at 47.
Human Rights Watch, supra note 9, at 21-27.
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The Nellie massacre was encouraged, though not directly committed, by members of the All Assam Students Union, which later evolved into the Asom Gana
Parishad party. Attacks in Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat, were coordinated and
led by political organisations, which, in Delhi and Gujarat, were closely affiliated with the political party in power. In each instance, violence escalated to the
extent it did because it was tolerated by the state. A few days before 18 February
1983, a thousand-strong crowd, armed and beating drums, had gathered around
Muslim villages in Nellie, closing off escape routes and ready to advance.1 2 The
police ignored residents' urgent pleas for help.1 3 In Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat
too, police inaction allowed predictable, preventable violence to escalate and
spread. 4 While government functionaries were cynically passive, some politicians
led violent mobs and others encouraged violence from a distance.
In the aftermath of these episodes of mass violence, both national and state
governments were apathetic about pursuing accountability. This is, perhaps, not
surprising, given the complicity of political leaders and government officials in
these attacks. Facilitating onslaughts against minorities carried little cost for the
political organizations involved. On the contrary, in Assam, Delhi and Gujarat,
the political parties that fomented violence reaped electoral gains and cemented
power.
III. SEEKING INFORMATION
While civil society groups have highlighted government failures during and
after mass sectarian violence, Indian governments have been slow to reveal and
reckon with their own lapses. In an attempt to bridge the gap between official
information about mass violence on the one hand and non-governmental analyses on the other, a few years ago I coordinated an attempt to access government
records on the attacks in Nellie, Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat.1 6 Beginning in
2009, a team of five researchers including myself used the Right to Information
Act" to seek official records on (1) criminal justice, (2) action against negligent
or culpable public functionaries, and (3) relief and reparation for victims after
each of these catastrophic episodes.

1

13

14
15

Wireless message from Officer in Charge, Nagaon Police Station to the Commandant, 5 Assam
Police Battalion and Officer in Charge, Jagiroad Police Station, 14 February 1983, in Tewary
Commission, supra note 2, Exhibit 55 at 306, para 13.155.
Id.
Supra note 2; supra note 6; supra note 7; supra note 8.
See Kaur, supra note 6; Human Rights Watch, Compounding Injustice: The Government's
Failures to Address Massacres in Gujarat (2003); Surabhi Chopra, Nellie 1983 in ON THEIR
WATCH: MASS VIOLENCE AND STATE APATHY IN INDIA - EXAMINING THE RECORD 311-331 (Surabhi

Chopra & Prita Jha eds., 2014).
16

See Surabhi Chopra & Prita Jha, supra note 15.

Right to Information Act, 2005, No. 22 of 2005, (India) ("RTI Act").
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A quest for government records of this nature could not have been attempted
before the enactment of the Right to Information ("RTJ") Act in 2005. When this
landmark law came into force, it upended the entrenched status quo whereby
government records had been substantially protected from public scrutiny by the
colonial-era Official Secrets Act.' Under the transparency-focussed RTI Act, public authorities can withhold specified types of official information, 9 including,
inter alia, records affecting diplomatic ties with other countries 20 or records that
might hamper the investigation of a crime, 2 1 but are obligated to disclose information that falls outside those protected categories. 22 Individuals, in turn, have
an expansive right to information under the RTI Act, and can ask the state for
a wide swathe of official records without having to justify why they want this
information or show that they are directly affected by it. 23 These provisions, particularly the freedom to request records without demonstrating a personal nexus,
made it possible to approach a range of public authorities for information on mass
violence.
A. Outcomes
The research team filed 824 applications for official records. Out of these, 255,
or 31% of the total, elicited some information in the first instance. 324, or 40%,
were transferred to other public authorities. 245 of these, or 29%, were met with
silence - or "deemed refusal" within the terms of the RTI Act. 2 4
The RTI Act permits applicants to appeal a refusal to disclose information,
with an initial appeal being considered within the relevant public authority, and if
this is unsuccessful, a subsequent appeal lying with the commission on the right
to information in that particular state. 25 The research team filed 515 first appeals
against deemed and reasoned refusals. Given resource constraints, we chose to
file very few second appeals, as these tend to be subject to long delays.
The RTI Act had not previously been used on this scale to examine the aftermath of mass atrocities. Consequently, the research project tested the law's potential to illuminate the state's response to mass violence, and, more generally, to
elicit information about grave human rights violations. 2 6

1
19
2

21
22
23
24
25

26

Official Secrets Act, 1923, No. 19 of 1923 (India).
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 8.
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 8(1)(a).
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 8(1) (h).
RTI Act, supra note 17, §§ 3, 7.
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 6(2).
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 7(2).
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 19.
Surabhi Chopra et. al., Exercising the Right to Information in On Their Watch: Mass Violence

and State Apathy in India - Examining the Record 21-53 (Surabhi Chopra, & Prita Jha eds.,
2014).
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Records that are years, and even decades old, are a challenging request from
the state's perspective. We found that public authorities that routinely perform
citizen-facing functions were markedly better able to engage with applications
for such information. District administrations and the police usually responded
promptly to applications for information, even if denying the request. Other public authorities were more likely to be silent or hostile. For example, the army
headquarters in Delhi asked us, contrary to the RTI Act, to justify why we
wanted records related to the army's efforts to control mass violence in 1984.27
Disappointingly, state commissions for minorities - institutions specifically mandated to protect minority rights - did not respond to applications seeking information about these events where the Sikh and Muslim communities had been targets
of brutal violence. 28 The Ministry of Home Affairs deflected requests for information about mass violence by transferring them to other public authorities. 29
When public authorities refused to release particular records, their reasons
often betrayed a misreading of the RTI Act. Under the Act, government records
that are more than twenty years old can be withheld by the state on far fewer
grounds than more recent records.3 0 Older information is, therefore, more freely
"disclosable" than records of more recent vintage. However, in four instances,
public authorities reversed this provision of the RTI Act, and insisted that records
dating back two decades or more need not be disclosed at all.3 ' Similarly, on two
occasions, the Delhi police refused to release information related to criminal proceedings, citing the RTI Act's provision that records could be withheld if disclosure would "impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution
of offenders".3 2 The police interpreted the RTI Act as ring-fencing anything
related to criminal proceedings from disclosure. In fact, as the Delhi High Court
has clarified, the police need to justify why disclosure would hamper the investigation of a crime rather than using the provision to withhold an entire category of
information.33
Thus, access to official records was influenced by the capacity and attitude
of public authorities. Even more salient to the chances of access was the type of
information being sought. Governments baulked at disclosing any records about
disciplining and prosecuting government officials and political functionaries.
Almost all the research team's applications for information on this issue were
rejected or studiously ignored.3 4
27
28

29
30
31

32
3

34

Id. at 49.
Surabhi Chopra et. al., supra note 26, at 44-45.
Surabhi Chopra et. al., supra note 26, at 49.
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 8(3).
Surabhi Chopra et. al., supra note 26, at 40.
RTI Act, supra note 17, § 8(1)(h).
Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information Commr., 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1607 : (2008) 146 DLT 385,
at ¶ 13.
Surabhi Chopra et. al., supra note 26, at 47.
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By contrast, the police and district administrations in Assam, Delhi, and
Gujarat readily disclosed information on criminal proceedings. Information about
relief and reparation for victims was also disclosed by state and national governments, although records on this issue tended to be disorganised and incomplete.
B. Loss and destruction
While the research team accessed important information on criminal justice
and reparation, other, equally significant official records on these issues remained
elusive even though the relevant public authorities were willing to disclose them
in principle. Some information seems to be poorly maintained as a matter of
course. For example, neither courts nor governments had information on post-trial
appeals in relation to crimes committed in Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat.35 Other
information had been destroyed over the years, as a part of routine record-management. A high proportion of records relating to the Nellie massacre in 1983
and the attacks on Sikhs in Delhi in 1984 no longer existed. 36 By comparison,
numerous and detailed records about more recent mass violence against Muslims
in Gujarat in 2002 survived and were disclosed to the research team. 37
The destruction of official records on mass violence harms the historical
record and the scope for understanding the state's failures. While non-state information is plentiful for some episodes of mass violence, it is far scarcer for others. In 2002, a competitive electronic media covered mass violence in Gujarat
as it happened. Human rights groups meticulously documented the aftermath.
In comparison, much less is known about the killing of over 2000 people in
Nellie in 1983. Nor have the sustained attacks on Muslims in Bhagalpur in 1989
been researched as thoroughly as mass violence in Delhi in 1984 and Gujarat in
2002. The multiple, intersecting documents generated by public authorities are
a rich source of knowledge, particularly in relation to events that are not well
documented by civil society. Further, examining the records generated by state
processes allows us to identify where these processes fail. Understanding recurrent lapses, the points where prosecuting crimes or compensating victims goes
awry, necessarily precedes developing better, less corruptible responses to mass
violence. 38

If information that is significant for systemic reform and public memory is lost
on the one hand, on the other hand, the prospects for accountability might also be
35

Surabhi Chopra & Prita Jha, supra note 15, Prita Jha & Surabhi Chopra, Access to Criminal
Justice, at 278.

36

37
38

Prita Jha et. al., Access to CriminalJustice in On Their Watch: Mass Violence and State Apathy
in India - Examining the Record (Surabhi Chopra, & Prita Jha eds., 2014), at 278.
Id. at 48.
Surabhi Chopra, Mass violence in India: Using the right to information to examine the state's
response, Harvard South Asia Institute blog (12 June 2015), http://harvardsai.tumblr.com/
post/121350690170/mass-violence-in-india-using-the-right-to.
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harmed when official records related to mass violence are destroyed. Particularly
when political parties that supported the violence are in power, redress, whether
criminal, compensatory or symbolic, is likely to be elusive. Opportunities to
assign responsibility, punish the guilty and rehabilitate victims might arise years
after the fact. Over time, power might change hands, particular individuals might
be jettisoned by parties that once shielded them from accountability, public sympathies might shift, court decisions or international pressure might force the government to act. While these developments can be campaigned for, they cannot
be predicted.3 9 It is crucial, therefore, that official records on episodes of mass
violence are preserved.
C. Preserving information
Knowledge about serious atrocities has been preserved and disseminated in
many countries through the mechanism of truth commissions. While such institutions have not been established in India thus far, Indian governments have tended
to set up commissions of inquiry after large-scale episodes of identity-based
violence. After each of the sectarian conflagrations in Nellie in 1983, Delhi in
1984, Bhagalpur in 1989 and Gujarat in 2002, official inquiries were launched to
examine what had happened.40 Drawing upon these endeavours, I discuss how
official inquiries could provide a potential anchor for preserving information on
mass violence and making it accessible. Detailed analysis of the inquiries conducted after each episode of mass violence is beyond the scope of this article,
and my observations are intended to prompt dialogue and identify questions for
further scrutiny. Below, I point out the potential as well as the problems with
commissions of inquiry as vehicles for sharing information about mass sectarian
violence.
The commissions that examined the episodes of violence mentioned above
were temporary, ad hoc institutions appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act," which empowers both governments and legislatures at the central and
state levels to establish such bodies to inquire into "any definite matter of public importance".42 While these commissions of inquiry focused on grave sectarian
39

Id.

40

See Tewary Commission, supra note 2 [inquiring into pre-election violence in Assam]; G.T.
Nanavati, Justice Nanavati Commission of Inquiry (1984 Anti-Sikh Riots), 9 February 2005,
New Delhi: Government of India [inquiring into violence targeting the Sikh community after
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination]; Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission of Inquiry,
August 1986, New Delhi: Government of Delhi [inquiring into violence targeting the Sikh community after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination]; Bhagalpur Inquiry, supra note 8
[inquiring into mass violence in Bhagalpur in 1989, focusing in particular on the district administration's performance]; G.T. Nanavati & A.H. Mehta, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 19
November 2014, Ahmedabad: Government of Gujarat [inquiring into the Godhra attack and mass
violence in Gujarat in 2002].
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, No. 50 of 1952, (India).
Id. at § 3.

41
42
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violence, they were not "truth-seeking" entities of the sort that have served as
transitional justice mechanisms in many parts of the world. Several states transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy since the 1980s appointed truth
commissions to excavate and record the abuses of past regimes, and to hear and
officially acknowledge what victims of such abuse had suffered 43 . Unlike truth
commissions, official commissions inquiring into mass violence in India have
typically been mandated to examine the state's actions rather than the experience
of victims.
This does not preclude attention to the harm inflicted on communities that
faced attacks, violence having been facilitated by government apathy and bias.
For example, the commission inquiring into mass violence in Bhagalpur noted
many significant details, such as the fact that the bodies of the dead in Logain
village were buried in mass graves that the police helped to conceal,"4 or that four
Muslims were lynched to death in Chara Baragaon while police constables ostensibly protecting them stood by and watched.45
However, a state-focused mandate has meant that commissions of inquiry
have been better placed to highlight administrative failings rather than document abuse. While the Bhagalpur Commission noted important details about how
violence was inflicted, it was at its most comprehensive and rigorous when it
highlighted how the police were derelict and brazenly sectarian while violence
unfolded. 46 Such cataloguing and analysis of administrative failures is a crucial
contribution, and one that commissions are distinctively suited for. Unlike a trial
court, which is narrowly focused on adjudicating the criminal liability of particular individuals, a commission can analyse government actions from a birds-eye
perspective.
A commission of inquiry is similarly well-placed to record the experiences
of victims and affected communities in a manner that adversarial criminal trials
cannot accommodate. However, the commissions that inquired into mass violence
in Assam, Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat missed the opportunity to do so.
The relative neglect of victims' experiences has meant that Indian commissions of inquiry have not played the role that truth commissions perform during
social transitions, of recognizing the state's responsibility for mass atrocities and
acknowledging what victims have suffered. As Cohen points out, there is a powerful difference between knowledge - knowing about the government's misdeeds

43

44

45
46

See Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the
Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, 7, 12-22, (1995). See also Onur Bakiner, TRUTH
COMMISSIONS: MEMORY, POWER, AND LEGITIMACY, (2015).
Bhagalpur Inquiry, supra note 40, paras 525-530.
Bhagalpur Inquiry, supra note 40, paras 548-549.
Bhagalpur Inquiry, supra note 40, paras 114, 136, 243, 570-585.
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- and acknowledgement - where the state owns up to wrongdoing.47 Formal, public acknowledgement, often after years of being silenced and discredited, can
bring immense relief to victims of abuse. Truth commissions have been a means
for the state to consciously reject denial ("this never happened"), diminution
("what happened was not as bad as it is made out to be") or justification ("the
victims were at fault") of mass atrocity, and forge a narrative that accords respect
and equal citizenship to groups that were persecuted in the past. Such acknowledgement helps to recalibrate the political equilibrium and foster new norms: in
recognizing past abuse as wrong, the state commits itself to treating its citizens
considerably better.
The Indian commissions of inquiry considered in this article did not play the
role of bearing official witness to victims or confronting "the conscious coverup
and the convenient forgetting, the euphemistic renaming".8 While examining
majoritarian violence that was committed by political organizations and tied to
electoral mobilisation, these commissions have focused primarily on administrative failures.
The potential for such commissions to inform and influence people is limited
by other factors too. Unlike truth-seeking transitional justice mechanisms which
have typically scrutinised the abuses of past regimes, Indian commissions of
inquiry have often had to inquire into the actions of governments and politicians
in power at the time. Under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the government of
the day directly chooses the members of a commission that is mandated to examine, inter alia, that same government's failings. Commissioners thus appointed
on some previous occasions have tended to downplay the involvement of senior
officials and politicians. For instance, former Supreme Court justice Ranganath
Mishra, who headed a commission to inquire into violence against Sikhs in 1984
notoriously disregarded important evidence and exonerated senior Congress party
politicians.49 He subsequently became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
India, and later represented the Congress in the Rajya Sabha for six years. After
mass violence in Gujarat in 2002, the state government appointed a single person,
Justice K.G. Shah, a former justice of the Gujarat High Court who was reportedly
close to the leaders of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, 0 to inquire into what
had happened. Protests led the government to appoint a second commissioner,
while retaining Justice Shah in the role as well. The interim report of a commission inquiring into attacks on Christians in Kandhamal, Orissa in 2008 failed

4
48
49
50

Stanley Cohen, supra note 43, at 18.
Id. at 15.
Jaskaran Kaur, supra note 6, at 81-92.
Tehelka, The Truth: Gujarat 2002, (Tehelka), http://www.tehelka.com/video/the-truth-gujarat2002-arvind-pandya/; See also Manas Dasgupta, Nanavati panel takes note of Pandyas remarks,

The Hindu, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/nanavati-panel-takes-note-ofpandyas-remarks/articlel939434.ece.
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to mention the well-documented organizational role played by Hindu-majoritarian
political groups.5
Acquiescent commissioners are likely to prevaricate and neglect crucial information in their final reports; they are also likely to lose the confidence of victims,
and thereby forgo important testimony. During the early years of the NanavatiShah commission's work in Gujarat, for example, many Muslim witnesses refused
to testify because they feared retaliation and found the atmosphere during proceedings to be hostile.5 2
Once inquiries into mass violence have concluded, their findings have
remained remarkably inaccessible. The Commissions of Inquiry Act requires that
the final reports of inquiries must, within six months of completion, be reported
to the national parliament if a commission was established by the central government or the state assembly if the commission was established at the state level,
along with the government's response to commission findings.53 Once placed
before the legislature, inquiry reports as well as government responses are, technically, in the public domain. In fact, however, this is not the case.
The report of the inquiry into the killing of Hindu pilgrims in Gujarat is available online, 4 but the state government does not seem to have made the inquiry
report on violence against Muslims similarly available. During the research project discussed in Section II above, the research team found that the Parliament
library only held the reports of two inquiries into mass violence in 1984.11 The
governments of Delhi and Bihar disclosed the final reports by commissions of
inquiry in response to right to information applications. Similar applications to
state assemblies and the national Ministry of Home Affairs elicited no response.5 6
Assam's Home Department denied an application for the Tewary Commission
report, but later disclosed the report in response to an application for information
on the district administration's response to the Nellie massacre. This copy is very
likely one of the few that survives of an inquiry that was never formally made
public.

5

Justice Sarat ChandraMohapatra submits interim report on Kandhamal riot, Orissa Diary, (July

2, 2009), http://www.orissadiary.com/currentnews.asp?id=13226.
5

5
54

Human Rights Watch, Discouraging Dissent: Intimidation and Harassment of Witnesses, Human
Rights Activists, and Lawyers Pursuing Accountability for the 2002 Communal Violence in
Gujarat, (2004), at 3.

Commissions of Inquiry Act, supra note 41, at § 3(4).
Available on the website of the Department of Home Affairs, Government of Gujarat, at http://
www.home.gujarat.gov.in/homedepartment/downloads/godharaincident.pdf.
Surabhi Chopra, Holding Public Officials Accountable in On Their Watch: Mass Violence and

State Apathy in India - Examining the Record (Surabhi Chopra, & Prita Jha eds., 2014), at
305-306.
56

Id.
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While the final reports of inquiries could be secured through the RTI Act, the
evidentiary material gathered during these inquiries was not similarly obtainable.
Admittedly, disclosing the vast array of material considered by commissions of
inquiry to an individual right-to-information applicant is likely to disproportionately burden the government. However, rather than deflecting disclosure, governments should obviate the need to apply for this information at all. The state
should use the material gathered over the course of these prolonged inquiries to
create archives on episodes of mass sectarian violence.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence has noted that simply "warehousing"
records is not the same as creating an archive. 7 It is worth noting that official
information about mass violence in India has not even been adequately warehoused thus far, given the amount that has been lost over time. Commissions
of inquiry on mass violence have served, whatever their individual flaws, as
occasions to collate disparate records and gather testimony. This collection of
material could provide the nucleus for public archives, to which additional information - state and non-state - could be added. As recommended by the Special
Rapporteur, such archives should not simply be a depository, but an easily accessible resource designed to protect and preserve information on some of the most
serious atrocities that India has experienced.
The information collected by commissions inquiring into mass violence
includes, inter alia, government records as well as transcripts of testimony by
victims, witnesses, alleged perpetrators, politicians and officials. Institutionalised
access to this information would be important for researchers, educators, victims
of violence, their descendants, and the public at large. Various and diffuse, these
documents would complicate and contextualise inquiry reports, some of which,
as discussed above, are slanted to advantage senior officials and political leaders.
Archives would not promote accountability for mass violence in and of themselves. But they would provide access to the raw material that can help to challenge political denial or revisionism about targeted violence against religious
minorities. They would also be a means to ensure that the testimony recorded
during temporary, time-bound official inquiries survives for the long-term.
Preserving victim testimony might facilitate memorialisation, whether non-state
or official, in the future.5 8
Some of the material gathered by commissions - transcripts of witness testimony, in particular - would no doubt raise concerns about privacy and personal
safety. But a framework for addressing these concerns could be developed based
upon existing right to information standards. For example, the option to request
5
5

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of
non-recurrence, United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/24/42, at ¶ 85 (August 28, 2013).
Id. at 83.
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anonymity or redaction could be offered to individuals who have testified before
a commission in the past. Sensitive testimony that might distress or endanger the
witness if archived could be anonymised or redacted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sectarian attacks in Nellie in 1983, Delhi in 1984, Bhagalpur in 1989 and
Gujarat in 2002 were concentrated in space and time, but their legacy persists.
Many of the individuals and communities who were targeted carry lifelong burdens of bereavement, disability, immiseration, trauma and grief. But since these
events disproportionately harmed religious minorities, they are especially vulnerable to being minimised and dismissed amidst the machinations of democratic
politics. The diminution of victims' suffering and the state's complicity should
be resisted by creating archives that draw upon the material already gathered by
flawed official inquiries. Establishing official archives would tacitly acknowledge
the gravity of these episodes of mass sectarian violence. The information preserved as a result would strengthen the historical record, weaken revisionism, and
perhaps even help to redress past crimes.

